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Résumé :Il existe une tension apparente entre l’idée d’apprenant autonome, promue par les tenants des classes 
« participatives », et l’argument participatif selon lequel l’apprentissage est un processus intrinsèquement collectif 
d’induction vers des formes d’action historiquement établies. Dans cet article, nous essayons de comprendre la nature 
de cette tension et ses conséquences pour les pratiques d’éducation. Nous commençons par une brève présentation de 
la perspective commognitive sur l’apprentissage, qu’on peut considérer comme une version particulière de l’approche 
participative, selon laquelle la pensée est une forme individualisée de la communication interpersonnelle et l’apprentissage 
scolaire un processus de modification et d’extension de ce discours. Nous introduisons alors la distinction entre apprentissage 
niveau-objet et apprentissage niveau-meta, ce dernier nécessitant de suivre ceux-qui-savent plutôt que de se limiter à 
conduire ses propres explorations inventives. Nous soutenons qu’un certain taux de compréhension et d’accords mutuels 
est nécessaire pour que l’apprentissage méta soit efficace. Quelques exemples illustratifs, pris en classes de mathématiques 
et de statistiques, montrent un apprentissage qui survient alors que l’accord est respecté, et d’autres ce qui se passent 
lorsque certains éléments de cet accord sont violés. Nous concluons avec une mise en garde contre une interprétation 
rapide et unidimensionnelle du principe de l’autonomie de l’apprenant.
Mots-clés : Autonomie de l’apprenant, discours, apprentissage niveau objet, apprentissage niveau méta, accord 
d’enseignement apprentissage, commognition
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Introduction: Learning and Autonomy
For humans, every interaction constitutes an 
opportunity for both learning and teaching. The 
overpowering tendency toward educating and 
being educated is a natural entailment of our being 
inherently social creatures whose whole existence 
depends on their capacity for collective action. To 
ensure interpersonal coordination, individuals need 
to adhere to certain routines and mitigate individual 
deviations. This can only be done by constant mutual 
adjustment and fine-tuning.
Encounters between novices and experts are 
probably the most obvious, indeed irresistible, invi-
tations to teaching and learning, and school is the 
place that brings novices and experts together and 
institutionalizes their roles as, respectively, learners 
and teachers. This article is an extended reflection 
on the division of labor between those who learn and 
those who teach. More specifically, we focus on the 
question of how autonomous one can be as a learner 
when her spontaneously developed ways of acting 
are thrown into the melting pot of schooling.
There are probably as many possible varia-
tions on the theme of learner’s autonomy as there 
are people who learn. Just think about the striking 
contrast between the learning processes induced by 
the mythological heroes Daedalus and Ariadne when 
each one of them was trying to help his or her loved-
ones to escape King Minos’ prisons. Ariadne, to guide 
her beloved Theseus through Minotaur’s labyrinth, 
provided the young man with a thread which he 
was told to follow faithfully and without questions. 
Daedalus, on the other hand, armed his son Icarus 
with wings and let him choose his own trajectory. 
These two instructional approaches may well be 
marking the opposite ends of the spectrum of possi-
bilities available to teachers who wish to lead unini-
tiated through the mazes of mathematics, history or 
literature. The question of which option should be 
chosen is far from simple. Although Ariadne’s pre-
designed learning trajectory seems to be the surest 
path toward the teacher’s goal 1 , her approach would 
probably be criticized by those for whom the prin-
ciple of honoring the learner’s own thinking is not 
any less important than the final outcome of her 
explorations. The most radical interpreters of the idea 
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of student’s autonomy are likely to adopt Daedalus’s 
approach. Alas, one should not forget the unhappy 
ending of Icarus’ story 2. Obviously, there is no one 
fully satisfactory answer to the question of what it 
means for the learner to be autonomous.
This said, at any given time in history some peda-
gogies are more popular than some others. Ariadne’s 
prescriptive tactics, although rather extreme, is not 
too distant from what was actually happening in 
schools for ages, until just a few decades ago. The 
risks inherent in the Daedalus’ choice notwithstan-
ding, there is a clear shift nowadays toward letting 
students choose their own learning trajectories. This 
preference can clearly be felt in many policy docu-
ments, and the one called Principles and Standards for 
school mathematics seems to be among them:
A major goal of school mathematics programs is to 
create autonomous learners… Students learn more and 
learn better when they take control of their learning 
by defining their goals and monitoring their progress. 
When challenged with appropriately chosen tasks, 
students become confident in their ability to tackle 
difficult problems, eager to figure things out on their 
own, flexible in exploring mathematical ideas and trying 
alternative solution paths, and willing to persevere 
(National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, 2000, 
p. 21; emphases added).
On the face of it, these principles are indeed very 
much in tune with Daedalus’ pedagogy: the request for 
autonomy in learning seems to imply that the student 
should be the principal, if not the only, designer and 
implementer of the learning process. At a closer look, 
however, the idea of autonomy admits of several inter-
pretations. How one translates such terms as control of 
learning or figuring things out on their own into actions 
depends on his or her understanding of the term lear-
ning. Only those who think of learning as “acquiring 
knowledge” and of knowledge itself as a portable entity 
that resides somewhere in the world and can be repro-
duced by the student within her head are likely to view 
the above exhortation as supporting Daedalus’ deci-
sions. In this acquisitionist language, learning implies 
a conversation with the world rather than with other 
people, and the phrase “learner’s own control of lear-
ning” can, indeed, be understood as implying student’s 
almost unbounded freedom in deciding how and where 
new knowledge can be found (“figured out”).
The interpretation changes rather dramatically 
when one switches to a participationist perspec-
tive that defines learning as initiation to patterned, 
historically established forms of activity. Being inhe-
rently social in their origins, these uniquely human 
forms of doing cannot possibly be mastered without 
an interaction with a competent doer and without 
a genuine wish to follow in the expert’s footsteps. 
Although one can still talk about learner’s autonomy, 
the terms “control of learning” and “figuring on one’s 
own” must now be interpreted as referring to one’s 
collaboration with people rather than directly with 
the world as such. More specifically, the “control” 
is to be understood as a form of command over 
different forms of interaction with others, and the 
“sense-making” is to be interpreted as student’s effort 
to make sense of foreign forms of talk about the world 
rather than trying to fathom the nature of this world 
in a direct manner.
There is an apparent tension between the notion 
of autonomous learning and the idea of learning 
as an inherently collective process of induction to 
historically established forms of action. The wish to 
understand the nature of this tension and its conse-
quences for educational practice fuels our efforts 
along the following pages. Our guiding assumption is 
that learner’s autonomy is possible and desirable also 
when learning means adopting other people’s ways 
of acting. We begin with a brief presentation of the 
commognitive perspective on learning, a particular 
version of the participationist approach, according to 
which thinking is an individualized form of interper-
sonal communication and school learning is a process 
of modifying and extending one’s discourse. We then 
introduce the distinction between object-level and 
meta-level learning, of which only the latter requires 
trying to follow those in-the-know rather than just 
conducting one’s own inventive explorations. We 
claim that a certain amount of mutual understan-
dings and agreement is necessary if the meta-learning 
is to be effective (that is, if it is to bring the change 
expected by the teacher and the curriculum deve-
loper). A number of examples, coming from mathe-
matics and statistics classrooms, will show a case of 
learning occurring when the agreement is respected, 
and will instantiate what happens when its different 
elements are violated. We conclude with a caveat 
against careless, one-dimensional interpretation of 
the principle of learner’s autonomy.
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Commognitive Perspective on Learning
Basic commognitive tenets: Thinking as indivi-
dualized communication and school learning 
as becoming adept in historically established 
discourses.
Commognitive perspective on learning (Sfard, 
2007, in press) is rooted in the participationist 
assumption that all uniquely human skills are 
products of individualization of historically esta-
blished collective activities. Thus, young children 
develop the ability to speak, read or cook by gradually 
turning from “legitimate peripheral participants” 
(Lave & Wenger, 1991) who can only implement 
small parts of the job in collaboration with others 
into independent performers, who can do the task 
on their own and resort to it on their on accord. 
Thinking, probably the most distinctive of human 
forms of doing, is no different: it too is develop-
mentally secondary to a certain patterned collective 
form of doing, namely, to the activity of communi-
cating. According to the commognitive assumption, 
uniquely human form of thinking appears when a 
child becomes able to communicate with herself the 
way others communicate with her. The word commo-
gnition, a combination of cognition and communica-
tion, was coined to epitomize this claim, that is, to 
always remind us that human thinking develops, 
both historically and ontogenetically, through indi-
vidualization of interpersonal communication. 
This communication does not have to be verbal or 
audible. Within commognitive perspective, therefore, 
cognitive processes and processes of inter-personal 
communicating are but different manifestations of 
basically the same phenomenon.
Just as there is a multitude of recreational games 
– chess, bridge, basketball, etc. – played with diverse 
tools and according to diverse rules, so there are 
many types of commognition, differing one from 
another in their patterns, objects, and the types of 
mediators used. Like in the case of games, indivi-
duals may be able to participate in certain types of 
communicational activity and be unable to take part 
in some others. In this paper, the different types of 
communication that bring some people together 
while excluding some others will be called discourses. 
The diverse domains of human knowledge learned 
in schools – mathematics, physics, statistics, history, 
etc. – can now be seen as special types of communi-
cation. These different discourses are made distinct, 
among others, by their vocabularies (keywords and 
their use), visual mediators, routines and the narratives 
which the discursants tell and endorse (for a detailed 
presentation of these four characteristics see Sfard, 
2007, in Press; Sfard & Lavie, 2005). While enga-
ging in different forms of communication, people are 
telling different, mutually complementing and some-
times incommensurable stories about the world.
Given this definition of discourse, any human 
society may be divided into partially overlapping 
communities of discourses. To be members of the same 
discourse community, individuals do not have to face 
one another and do not need to actually communi-
cate. The membership in the wider community of 
discourse is won through participation in commu-
nicational activities of any collective that practices 
this discourse, be this collective as small as it may. 
Learning mathematics, history or statistics may now 
be defined as individualizing respective discourses, 
that is, as the process of becoming able and willing, 
whenever appropriate, to have mathematical, histo-
rical or statistical communication not only with 
others, but also with oneself.
Levels of discursive learning
Having defined school-type learning as an acti-
vity in which the student modifies and extends 
her discursive repertoire, we may now distinguish 
between two levels of learning, object-level and meta-
level, both of them necessary if a person is to gain 
satisfactory mastery of, say, mathematics, statistics or 
history. Let us explain this distinction with the help 
of examples.
The main goal of a person who engages in a 
discourse learned in school is to become more 
knowledgeable about the objects of this discourse. 
Thus, while learning zoology, students get acquainted 
with different types of animals, while studying 
history they learn about past communities, and while 
engaging in mathematical discourse they investigate 
such mathematical objects as numbers, triangles, sets 
and functions. The explorations, which eventually 
produce endorsed narratives about the object in 
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question, are usually done according to well defined 
meta-rules 3, specific to the given type of discourse.
The rather straightforward type of learning 
presented in the above paragraph will from now 
on will be called object-level. This is not the only 
one that is required, though, if the discourse is to 
evolve in accord with the historical development of 
mathematical communication. One developmental 
phenomenon that is quite general but is particularly 
salient in scientific, mathematical, and statistical 
discourses is an occasional emergence of new objects 
of investigation. Indeed, some of the “things” that 
are investigated by scientists or mathematicians, 
rather than being found directly in the world, are 
produced through the discourse itself. Thus, notions 
such as velocity and energy in physics, distribution 
and mean in statistics, or set and function in mathe-
matics, although clearly related to observable real-
world phenomena are, in fact, discursive constructs 
created for the sake of a better description of reality 4. 
Together with new objects, the meta-rules of investi-
gation and endorsement may also change, sometimes 
beyond recognition (Sfard, 2007). For example, 
when mathematical discourse is extended so as to 
include negative numbers, the meta-rule accor-
ding to which one endorses basic statements about 
mathematical objects (e.g., “2+3=5”) on the basis of 
extra-discursive evidence is no longer in force: the 
only argument one can use to substantiate the claim 
that ‘minus times minus is plus’ is that of the inner 
consistency and the usefulness of the thus created 
discourse. Learning that involves a change in meta-
rules results in a discourse that is incommensurable 
with the one from which it evolved: some endorsed 
narratives of the old and new discourses may now 
sound contradictory and mutually exclusive, whereas 
in fact the respective discursants are simply using the 
same words in differing ways and judging endorsa-
bility according to different meta-rules 5 . Learning 
that results in an incommensurable discourse will be 
called meta-level 6 .
Ways to learn
Whereas object-level learning leads simply to 
an extension of a discourse – it increases the set 
of “known facts” (endorsed narratives) about the 
investigated objects – meta-level learning is a trans-
formation of the discourse: it changes the vocabulary 
and the ways in which explorations are done. There 
is, therefore, a significant difference in the nature 
of discursive change induced by the two types of 
learning: In mathematics, more than in any other 
discourse, the object-level change is a product of the 
logical necessity, whereas the meta-level transforma-
tion is a result of a historically sanctioned custom 
and is thus contingent rather than inevitable (Sfard, 
2007). Because of this all-important difference, 
object-level and meta-level learning challenge the 
student in different ways and must thus follow signi-
ficantly different paths.
Object-level learning occurs when the student 
is already reasonably familiar with the objects and 
meta-rules of the given discourse. At this point, 
the goal of the learning is to get better acquainted 
with the properties of the object. In mathematics, it 
means extensive explorations in which the known 
meta-rules are systematically applied. This, indeed, 
is what happens when one investigates, for instance, 
functions or system of equations, examines proper-
ties of numbers or of geometric figures, etc. This type 
of learning results, on the one hand, in new mathe-
matical narratives which, after being endorsed are 
called theorems; and on the other hand, in a greater 
discursive proficiency of the student.
Meta-level learning is not nearly as straight-
forward. When faced with the need to deal with 
unfamiliar objects or with new meta-rules, the 
student confronts paradoxical, mutually contradic-
ting requirements: since mathematical objects are 
discursive constructs, they can only arise by being 
talked about them; however, how can a person talk 
about an object without being already familiar with 
it? Similarly, the only possible reason to change meta-
rules that have been working well in the past is the 
fact that the resulting discourse is more useful than 
the former; but how can the student become aware 
of the usefulness of the modified discourse without 
actually participating in it?
Because of this, and because of the contingency 
of meta-level transformations, the only conceivable 
way to induce the required meta-level changes is by 
letting the student immerse herself in a conversation 
with experienced discursant. More specifically, meta-
level learning can only happen in the process of scaf-
ARIADNE’S THREAD, DAEDALUS’ WINGS, AND THE LEARNER’S AUTONOMY 
Dani Ben-Zvi & Anna Sfard
121
folded individualization: the student joins experienced 
discursants in implementing discursive tasks, acting 
first only as a spectator and then as peripheral parti-
cipant. At this point, the student experiences the new 
forms of talk as a discourse-for-others – as a mode of 
communication that she is ready to use in conversa-
tion with others because it makes sense to the others 
(this, as opposed to its being used in self-communica-
tion). As time goes by, the amount of the scaffolding 
required by the newcomer gradually decreases and her 
part in the implementation of relevant tasks steadily 
grows. If the process of individualization proceeds 
properly, the student, while becoming more and more 
independent as tasks’ implementer, gradually ratio-
nalizes the new discourse, that is, discovers its inner 
coherence and becomes aware of its applicability and 
usefulness. This is, indeed, what needs to happen if 
the process of learning is to attain its ultimate goal 
of turning the discourse of others into a discourse-
for-oneself – a discourse to which, from now on, 
the learner would turn spontaneously whenever it 
may help her in solving her own problems 7 . At this 
stage, the new form of communication turns into the 
discourse of one’s thinking and the student becomes 
able to engage in independent object-level learning. 
This latter form of learning involves further explo-
rations of discursive objects. This time, these latter 
routines may already be performed on the person’s 
own accord and without any scaffolding. In the next 
section, we address the question of what needs to 
happen in order for such full cycle of meta-learning 
to be completed.
Meta-level Learning, Scaffolded Participation, 
and Learning-Teaching Agreement
Learning-teaching agreement as a condition for 
meta-level learning
Contrary to what might have been understood 
from the last paragraph, meta-level learning and 
object-level learning do not take place in a linear 
order, one after another. Because of the inherent 
circularities of the learning process, meta-level lear-
ning can only occur through scaffolded attempts at 
object-level explorations, albeit of a new kind. This 
means that the first step toward meta-level learning 
is an active engagement in a discourse that, at this 
initial point, is incommensurable with one’s own. 
It is reasonable to assume that some special condi-
tions must be fulfilled to ensure that the inevitable 
communicational gap between the learner and her 
more experienced interlocutors – teachers or more 
competent peers – catalyzes the desirable change 
rather than remaining an insurmountable hurdle 
to meaningful conversation. We now claim that 
the required change of the newcomers’ discourse 
seems unlikely to occur without a learning-teaching 
agreement – without a certain set of unwritten 
understandings about those aspects of this learning 
process that are essential to its success. For the 
meta-learning to happen, all the participants need 
to be unanimous, if only tacitly, about at least three 
basic aspects of the communicational process: the 
leading discourse, their own respective roles, and the 
nature of the expected change. Let us say a few words 
on each of these requirements 8 .
Agreement on the leading discourse. Interlocutors’ 
consent to follow a more or less uniform set of 
discursive routines is the condition for effective 
communication. Although this agreed set of rules 
will usually be negotiated by the participants and 
will end up being probably somehow different from 
any of those with which each individual entered the 
interaction, the process of change may be ineffec-
tive if the interlocutors do not agree about which of 
these initial discourses should be regarded as setting 
the standards. The issue of leadership in discourse 
is, of course, a matter of power relations. In a tradi-
tional classroom, the power structure was supposed 
to be fully determined by the institutional context: 
the teacher was the leader by default, and open 
resistance counted as deviation from the norm. In 
a reform classroom, as defined, for example, in the 
NCTM policy document, Principles and Standards 
(NCTM, 2000), the issue of discursive leadership is 
open to negotiation, at least in principle.
Agreement on the roles of interlocutors. In addi-
tion to the agreement with regard to the model-
discourse, those consensually recognized as leaders 
must be willing to play the role of teachers, whereas 
those whose discourses require adaptation must 
agree to act as learners. The acceptance of roles is 
not a formal act. Rather than expressing itself in 
any explicit declaration, this role-taking means 
a genuine commitment to the communicational 
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rapprochement. Such agreement implies that those 
who agreed to be teachers feel responsible for the 
change in students’ discourse and those who agreed 
to learn show confidence in the leader’s guidance 
and are genuinely willing to follow in the expert 
participants’ discursive footsteps (as documented 
in research literature, cases of student’s resistance 
are not infrequent; see for example, Litowitz, 1997; 
Forman & Ansell, 2002). It is important to stress that 
this acceptance of another person’s leadership does 
not mean readiness for mindless imitation. Rather, 
it means a genuine interest in the new discourse 
and a strong will to turn the new discourse from the 
discourse-for-others into a discourse-for-oneself.
Agreement on the necessary course of the discursive 
change. Students’ persistent participation in mathe-
matical talk when this kind of communication is 
for them but a discourse-for-others seems to be an 
inevitable stage in learning mathematics. If learning is 
to succeed, all the participants, the students and the 
teachers, have to have a realistic vision of what can 
be expected to happen in the classroom. In particular, 
all the parties to the learning process need to agree to 
live with the fact that the new discourse will initially 
be seen by the participating students as somehow 
foreign, and that it will be practiced only because of 
its being a discourse that others use and appreciate. 
To turn the discourse-for-others into a discourse-
for-oneself, the student must actively explore other 
people’s reasons for engaging in this discourse. This 
process of thoughtful imitation seems to be the most 
natural, indeed, the only imaginable way to enter new 
discourses 9 . It is driven by a need to communicate, 
so strong that it would often lead to what may seem 
in the eyes of some educators as the reversal of the 
“proper” order of learning: The learners would employ 
a rule enacted by another interlocutor as a prelude to, 
rather than a result of, their attempts to figure out the 
inner logic of this interlocutor’s discourse. Without 
the overpowering urge to communicate and the 
resulting readiness for the thoughtful imitation, we 
might never be able to learn anything that is uniquely 
human – not even our first language.
Meta-level learning and learning-teaching 
agreement in collaborative learning –examples
With participatory classrooms being a relatively 
new phenomenon, we are still in the dark about many 
aspects of today’s school learning. The dynamics of 
discursive lead-taking and lead-following is one of 
the most important topics for investigation. It is of 
particular interest to both theoreticians and practi-
tioners in the case of collaborative learning. Indeed, 
the special feature of the collaborative setting is that 
both parties to the learning-teaching agreement are 
the students themselves and that there is no desi-
gnated leader and no predetermined division of labor 
(e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 2006). In what follows, 
we explore four classroom episodes, trying to get a 
better sense of the relation between the quality of a 
learning-teaching agreement among the children and 
the effectiveness of meta-level learning.
More specifically, in each one of the four scenes 
we
(a) identify aspects of the discourse that imply that 
meta-level learning is necessary if the student is to make 
the transition to the new discourse;
(b) examine the interaction for the occurrence and 
the quality of learning-teaching agreement; and
(c) formulate a conjecture about the effectiveness 
of the learning that is taking place.
It is important to stress that because of the scar-
city of the empirical material that can be actually 
presented, we will not be able to make decisive 
claims about the observed phenomena. Whatever 
answers will be given to the above three questions 
should be treated as but conjectures which, in order 
to be anything more than that, would require much 
additional evidence. In what follows, our intention 
is simply to illustrate the method of analysis that 
allows to identify different aspects of meta-level lear-
ning and of learning-teaching agreement, and which 
is therefore necessary to answer questions a, b and c, 
as formulated earlier.
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Example 1: When learning-teaching agreement is 
in place and the leading discourse adheres to the estab-
lished rules 10 .
The vignette below is taken from a study in which 
a class of 12-year old seventh graders engaged, for 
the first time, in a discourse on negative numbers. 
The teacher, rather than presenting the students 
with ready made rules of operating on the extended 
number set, introduced several models (number 
line, arrow model, magic cubes 11 ) and invited the 
students to raise their own conjectures about how 
the new numbers can be added, subtracted and 
multiplied. In the present episode, two students, 
Sophie and Adva, try to figure out how to multiply 
two numbers, one of which is positive (marked with 
a plus) and the other is negative (marked with a 
minus). The girls help themselves with the number 
line, appearing on the page in front of them.
Episode 1: Sophie and Adva look for the product of differently signed numbers
[1]
Sophie Plus two times minus five 12 …
Points to the expression (+2)×(-5) 
written on the worksheet.
[2] Adva Two minus negative five
Shifts the worksheet closer to her 
and takes the pencil from Sophie.
[3] Sophie
A, wait, hold on … plus two … it’s as if you said minus five 
two times
[4] Adva And what about plus two? What about the plus?
[5] Sophie
Minus five … 
Looks intensely at what is written in 
front of her and speaks in «thinking 
aloud» mode.
One, tow, three, four, five ..
Counts on the number line in front 
of her the unit segments to the left 
of the zero; marks -5.
Times two – you know that plus two is two and you can drop 
the minus, right? So this is, as if …two multiplied by minus 
five, two times minus five .. 
so it is minus five plus minus five Turns to Adva and looks at her.
It makes minus ten
[6] Adva
I don’t know … the two plus here, perhaps the plus does 
mean something
Points at the plus sign before the 2.
[7] Sophie Right, you can drop the plus
[8] Adva So this is like … you can drop the minus
[9] Sophie
No, not the minus, because this is as if you do two times 
minus five
[10] Adva
Fine, we shall do it and then see
Six times minus four … six times minus four
Reads the next expression, 6(-4) 
from the worksheet.
[11] Sophie
Six times minus four … you do six times minus four, right 
… so it’s minus twenty four
Writes -24 next to the equal sign on 
the worksheet.
[12] Adva Fine. «Write a question..»
Starts reading a new task from the 
worksheet.
[13] Sophie Wait, we did not yet formulate the rule…
[14] Adva When there is an expression with both plus and minus …
As Adva is saying this, Sophie writes 
her words down on the worksheet.
[15] Sophie
You drop the plus and you multiply the minus by the number 
that had the plus.
Continues writing while speaking.
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Since the mathematical object negative number 
was introduced to the students just a few days 
earlier, there is clearly the need for meta-level 
learning, which requires trying to follow those in-
the-know rather than just conducting one’s own 
inventive explorations. We claim that for Sophie 
and Adva the situation is conducive to this type of 
learning because a learning-teaching agreement is 
also in place.
To begin with, although neither of the two prota-
gonists seems to have, as yet, a satisfactory command 
over the new discourse, one of them is clearly the 
leader. Indeed, Sophie is somewhat more competent 
and sure of herself than her partner, and both girls 
seem to agree that her ideas should be given the 
lead. This fact expresses itself in Sophie’s proactive 
behavior (see turns [3], [5], [7], [9], and [15], for 
example) which contrasts with Adva’s tendency to 
just react to her partner’s initiatives with challenges 
and requests for explanations ([4], [6], and [8]). 
Adva’s doubts and questions notwithstanding, she 
eventually accepts Sophie’s ideas, even if only tenta-
tively ([10]).
As an aside, let us remark that Sophie overcomes 
the circularity of object construction by treating the 
new numbers as if they had properties of numbers 
with which she is already familiar. Thus, she reads 
the expression (+2)x(-5) the way she read, say 2x7, 
that is, as expressing whatever appears to the right 
of the little dot as a number that needs to be added 
to itself (see turn [5]). Most importantly, she treats 
the symbol -5 as referring to a single entity. For 
Adva, on the other hand, -5 appears to be a mere 
concatenation of a number and the minus ([8]).
The second requirement of a learning-teaching 
agreement appears to be fulfilled as well: Sophie is 
committed to her role of the leader (“teacher”) and 
Adva acts as an ardent newcomer trying to get a 
genuine access to the new form of activity (learner). 
The latter student, although focused on her partner’s 
ideas rather than offering her own, does not simply 
follow Sophie’s lead in a mechanical manner. Her 
hesitation and the requests for explanations show 
her need for understanding the inner logic of the 
new discourse. Although the episode is too brief 
to allow for making definitive statements, it seems 
that Adva would not satisfy herself with purely 
ritualized participation and, in the longer run, will 
try to turn the discourse on negative numbers into 
a discourse-for-herself (at least, there is nothing 
in this present episode that would contradict this 
conjecture). Similarly, Sophie seems committed to 
her role as a leader: she answers Adva’s questions as 
well as she can, and even if her answers would not 
always satisfy an expert interlocutor, this needs to 
be taken as a sign of her need for accountability and 
her commitment to mutual alignment.
Finally, the students seem to agree about the 
manner in which their learning should proceed. 
Above all, they do not delude themselves that the 
command over the new discourse and, in particular, 
the sense of its meaningfulness, usefulness, and 
coherence, may happen overnight. When Adva, still 
hesitant and not fully convinced in spite of Sophie’s 
explanations decides to record the suggested solu-
tion ([10]), she comments, “We shall do it and then 
see.” Although this phrase may refer to a future 
verdict by an authority, possibly the teacher, it may 
also indicate the student’s readiness to suspend 
disbelief in the hope that clarity and a sense of cohe-
rence will emerge with discursive experience and 
practice. There is no reason to suspect that Sophie 
might disagree.
To sum up, in this episode the students are 
heading toward meta-level learning, and the situa-
tion seems favorable, in that the participants are in 
a full-fledged learning-teaching agreement. Since 
the necessary discursive change is time- and effort-
consuming, one cannot but make conjectures about 
Sophie’s and Adva’s present and future learning. One 
thing we may say with a measure of confidence is 
that in our brief episode there are many signs that 
the required learning might, indeed, be taking place: 
the students have re-constructed for themselves the 
canonical rule of multiplication which, indeed, is to 
be learned, and they had some initial experience in 
applying this rule to several simple cases.
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Example 2: When learning-teaching agreement is 
in place, but the leading discourse does not adhere to 
established rules
The same study provided us with an opportunity 
to see what may happen when students align them-
selves with a discourse that is not the one they were 
supposed to learn. The snippets that follow are taken 
from a whole-class discussion that followed work in 
pairs, of which episode 1 was an example. One of the 
students, Roi reports on the results of multiplying -2 
by 5 obtained by him and his partner.
Episode 2: The class accepts Roi’s rule for multiplying differently signed numbers
[1] Roi Minus ten
A n s w e r s  t h e  t a s k 
«2× (-5) = ?» that was just written by 
the teacher on the blackboard.
[2] Teacher Because?
[3] Roi
We simply did two times five equals minus ten … because 
five is the bigger number, so ah .. like two times five is ten, 
but it’s minus ten because we had minus five
[4] Teacher I don’t understand …
[5] Roi We don’t know how to explain that
[6] Teacher Think about something, try to explain
[7] Leegal
I too think that it is minus ten … see, you do two times five 
and then you do two times minus, and this is minus ten
[8] Teacher Why?
[9] Roi Because five is bigger than two
Slowly, Roi’s non-standard proposal, its inexpli-
cability notwithstanding, begins winning a general 
following. Only a few students object to what now 
seems to be a generally accepted rule of multiplica-
tion. Sophie is the only one to issue an open protest. 
Another student, Yasha, challenges Roi with a ques-
tion, “And what if it is seven, not two [if the opera-
tion is 7x (-5) rather than 2x (-5)]?” Before Roi has 
a chance to react, several students volunteer their 
answers.
Episode 2 (continued): The class accepts Roi’s rule for multiplying differently signed numbers
[10] Vladis
If the seven is bigger, then it will be plus, and if the five is 
bigger, it’s going to be minus.
[11] Guy
The explanation is that the bigger is the one which decides. 
Say, if seven is bigger, then it’s plus.
[12] Teacher
You are only repeating what Roi said last time, but I need to 
know why you think it is so.
[13] Yoaz Because this is what Roi is saying.
Guided by questions a, b, and c formulated above, 
we can now analyze these rather surprising events 
in terms of the kind of learning that was supposed 
to take place and of the learning-teaching agreement 
between the participants.
As was stated already in Example 1, the discursive 
change the teacher was aiming at qualifies as meta-
level, because new mathematical objects – negative 
numbers – had just been introduced and the students 
did not yet have a good sense of either the objects 
themselves or of meta-rules that guide endorsement 
or rejection of narratives about these objects.
In spite of the fact that none of the students 
seemed able to figure out the new meta-rules of 
endorsement (the teacher adamantly refrained from 
demonstrating her own discursive skills) – or perhaps 
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just because of that – they had implicitly chosen Roi 
as their discursive leader. This choice might have 
more to do with Roi’s being a “charismatic person” 
(as Roi described himself at a certain point) than with 
the nature of his arguments about the multiplication 
rule. This is, at least, what transpired from Yoaz’s 
frank admission that the reason for his acceptance of 
the non-routine rule of multiplication was the sheer 
fact that “this [was] what Roi [was] saying” ([13]).
Not all those who agreed with Roi, though, did it 
in a thoughtless manner. Several students summoned 
the ‘real-world’ rule of “the bigger is the one who 
decides” ([11]; this argument surfaced recurrently 
throughout the lengthy whole class conversation). It 
thus seems justified to say that in the majority of cases, 
those who accepted Roi’s leadership were genuinely 
interested in learning. The question whether Roi was 
equally interested in teaching is difficult to answer 
without additional data, but considering Roi’s insis-
tence and the explicitness with which he repeatedly 
described his ways of calculating throughout the 
conversation (see, for example, [3] and [9]), he was 
clearly quite keen to convert the children to his ideas. 
This might thus be a “missionary” type of teaching, 
but it was teaching nevertheless: Roi did want his 
classmates to follow in his discursive footsteps.
Finally, the students seemed to be in agreement 
about the ways in which the learning should take 
place. To say the least, there were no signs of uneasi-
ness about either the fact that Roi clearly viewed his 
rule as acceptable even in the absence of any expla-
nation ([5]), or about the nature and quality of the 
argument brought by some other students ([11]).
To sum up, in this present case, just as in the 
former one, a form of learning-teaching agreement 
does seem to exist. Moreover, we are witnessing 
meta-level learning of sorts: the children devise a rule 
for multiplying new kind of numbers, thus advan-
cing the work of establishing these as-yet unfamiliar 
mathematical constructs. This learning, however, be 
it effective as it may, is not the kind of learning the 
teacher aimed for: the discourse which developed is 
not the one that would be recognized as proper by an 
expert discursant.
Example 3: When the potential discursive leader 
does not have a discourse to offer 13
This time, we visit a sixth grade statistics lesson. 
In spite of their young age, the students are not alto-
gether unacquainted with the topic: they have already 
implemented carefully designed statistical investiga-
tions in grades 4 and 5. At present, they are engaged 
in a lengthy task, the aim of which is to make them 
familiar with the idea of representative sample and 
random sampling. In the excerpt that follows, they are 
dealing with a small part of a multi-step assignment 
focusing on the notion of biased sample. They have 
been provided with a plastic bag containing shoe 
laces of differing lengths and were asked to calculate 
the mean (arithmetic average) of lace length in two 
subsequently drawn samples of ten laces. Later, they 
were to formulate a conjecture about the mean length 
of all the laces in the bag (the population mean). In 
the episode below, Dan and Anat are grappling with 
this last question 14.
Episode 3: Dan and Anat are trying to figure out the mean length of the lace in the bag.
[1] Dan OK, read number ten
Asks Anat to read question 10 in the 
worksheet.
[2] Anat
«Based on your two samples, what is, in your opinion, the 
mean length of all the laces in the bag? Using the scale from 
1 to 10, how certain are you of this assessment?»
Reads quest ion 10 f rom the 
worksheet.
[3] Dan
Aha, ok, what do you say about the mean of the whole bag? 
If we had twenty altogether… the means were 16 and 14 
…… I think it is 18, something like that.
Refers to the two samples of ten 
laces that produced the means 16 
and 14, respectively.
[4] Anat
In my opinion, … I am certain of this … from 1 to 10 … 
seven, approximately.
Responds to the second part of the 
question about their confidence 
level in their answer.
[5] Dan Seven? That it is 18?
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The discourse about statistical sampling is new to 
the students and so are, in particular, the notions of 
sample and sampling variability, which signal unfami-
liar statistical objects. Some of the rules of the statis-
tical game are new as well (in particular, statistical 
sampling), and their similarity to what the students 
were used to in mathematics classroom is deceptive. 
The learners are now invited to engage in the empi-
rical work of measuring the laces rather than being 
given exact numerical data to manipulate in a formal 
way; and they are asked to “express their opinion” 
about certain magnitudes rather than actually 
calculate them. How the opinions can be shaped 
– whether they should be a result of mere guessing, 
of applying a formula to some numbers, or of making 
a well informed choice – is not immediately obvious 
to somebody who enters a statistics lesson directly 
from a mathematics classroom. It is therefore quite 
clear that the expected learning is going to happen 
first and foremost at the meta-level.
With regard to the learning-teaching agreement, 
this case appears similar to the one we saw in example 
1. Like in the case of Sophie and Adva, one member 
of the pair, Dan, is visibly more proactive and shows 
more confidence, whereas the other student, Anat, is 
mainly reactive: she explores her partner’s decisions, 
trying to understand why he is doing whatever he 
does. She may even be ready to follow in his foot-
steps, as long as Dan’s answers make sense to her. Just 
[6] Anat
No, I didn’t say it was 18. It is how certain I am about what 
we did on the whole.
[7] Dan
No, no, … Remember? We had this question before? They 
asked what would be the mean of the whole bag.
Refers to a previous case in which 
they drew and assessed just one 
sample.
So this is the same thing, but on the basis of two samples. Points to the current question.
[8] Anat Looks intensely on the worksheet.
[9] Dan
Aaaa…, I think that it is 18; the numbers we got are quite 
similar.
[10] Anat You have to calculate, don’t you think?
[11] Dan
See, first we got 14 in the first sample. Then we got 16 
centimeter. So it cannot be, say, 28 or 30. One needs a closer 
number.
[12] Anat But how do you know that this is exactly 18?
[13] Dan I .. I don’t know. I am not 100% sure of this Shrugs his shoulders.
[14] Anat
So perhaps we need to check this. One cannot just write a 
number.
[15] Dan But if you had, say, to guess the mean of the whole bag…
[16] Anat
But they don’t say here…. Silently reads the question.
«In your opinion, what is the mean length of all the….» Reads aloud.
[17] Dan This is the same as before
[18] Anat The length!
Seems to have eventually understood 
what they were requested to do.
[19] Dan Yes
[20] Anat
Aha, the mean length of the laces in the bag.
Of all of them … But we didn’t calculate them all. Raises her head and looks at Dan.
[21] Dan
Right. But judging from the two samples …
You remember the question …
Turns the worksheet and points to 
a question.
It was exactly the same
[22] Anat Aaa .., so 19, in my opinion
[23] Dan … Okay, eighteen and a half?
[24]
A n a t  a n d 
Dan
Giggling, the students turn to their 
respective worksheets and write 
down the agreed answer.
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as Adva challenged Sophie by presenting alternative 
possibilities, so does Anat challenge Dan by ques-
tioning his decisions, asking him why he chose one 
way of acting rather than another. Evidently inspired 
by the rules of mathematical discourse, Anat protests 
against what seems to her as Dan’s arbitrary choice 
of the number 18, claiming that one should calculate 
numerical answers rather than just guess them - see 
[10] (“You have to calculate, don’t you think?”), [12] 
(“But how do you know…?"), and [14] ("One cannot 
just write a number") 15 .
At a closer look, however, the situation here may 
be somewhat different from what we saw in Example 
1. This time, there is more symmetry between the 
students. Dan’s proactive behavior notwithstanding, 
he is not necessarily considered as a leader. Indeed, 
his partner is much more reluctant to walk in his 
footsteps than Adva was to follow Sophie. Anat is 
clearly determined to make her own distinctive 
contribution when she states that the population 
mean might be 19, and not 18, as suggested by 
her partner. Above all, however, there seem to be 
no leading discourse here, not even in the most 
restricted of senses. When asked to raise conjecture 
about the population mean, none of the children 
seems to have a clear idea of how such a conjec-
ture might be constructed. This stands in striking 
contrast with Sophie’s (successful) effort to derive 
the new rule – that of multiplying negative number 
by positive – from the previously learned definition 
of multiplication. Evidently, Anat and Dan faced a 
similar question already in one of the former tasks 
and what Dan is now proposing is the obvious alter-
native to the principled inference: they will repli-
cate what they did in this previous case ([7], [21]). 
Whereas the designers of the task expected the chil-
dren to propose a number close to the mean of the 
two sample means, 14 and 16, the students opt for 
numbers that are slightly greater than 16. The rule 
that may guide this decision, “mean slowly grows 
with the number of items in the set” ([9], [11]), is 
never explicitly spelled out, let alone substantiated.
In the absence of well defined criteria with which 
to make and justify their choices and to resolve any 
possible difference of opinions, Anat and Dan arrive 
at a joint decision in a manner that has nothing to 
do with statistical considerations. Their awareness of 
this fact is probably the reason why they giggle while 
writing down their answer. The final act of avera-
ging their proposals and ending up with the third 
number, 18.5 (see [23] and [24]) may be interpreted 
as a symbolic expression of the children’s wish to 
align themselves with one another at any cost. In 
the absence of the leading discourse, however, this 
wish to agree can not qualify as a learning-teaching 
agreement. The incident leaves us also quite skep-
tical with respect to the effectiveness of Anat’s and 
Dan’s meta-level learning. The students seem to have 
acted in an ad hoc manner, without developing a 
rule, routine, or word use that would be applicable 
beyond this particular case.
Example 4: When there is well-defined leading 
discourse but the learning-teaching agreement is only 
partial
In the classroom episode that follows, taken 
from the Montreal Algebra Study 16 , two 12-year 
old seven graders, Ari and Gur, are grappling with 
one of a long series of tasks supposed to usher 
them into algebraic thinking. On the worksheet in 
front of them, a linear function g(x) is introduced 
with the help of a partial table of values, and the 
students are required to find the value of g(6), which 
does not appear in this table. Using the given data, 
Ari has just found the slope (5) and the intercept 
(- 5) of g(x). The excerpt below begins when he 
writes down the formula of the function.
Episode 4: Ari and Gur calculate a value of a function given by a table.
[1] Ari Writes 5x+-5 on his worksheet.
[2] Gur What’s that? 
[3] Ari It’s the formula, so you can figure it out.
[4] Gur Oh. How’d you get that formula?
[5] Ari And you replace the x by 6.
Suggests how to solve the next task, 
i.e., find g(6).
[6] Gur Oh. Ok, I
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As before, let us try to answer the three ques-
tions about the nature of the expected learning, 
the quality of learning-teaching agreement, and the 
relation between the two. Since algebraic discourse 
at large and the notion of function in particular are 
new to the students, much meta-level learning has 
to occur before they gain a reasonable command 
over this new form of commognitive activity. Indeed, 
algebra has its own objects and its own rules of doing 
things, many of which are quite unlike anything the 
students have been accustomed to so far. Function, 
being their first tool for dealing with changing rather 
[7] Ari
Look. Cause the, um the slope, is the zero. Ah, no, the 
intercept is the zero.
[8] Gur Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. So you got your
[9] Ari
And then you see how many is in between each, like from 
zero to what
«each»: Ari points to both columns, 
indicating that you have to check 
both;
«from zero to what»: he points at 
the x column;
[10] Gur And the slope is, so the slope is 1.
The left counterpart of the right-
column 0 is 1.
[11] Ari Hum? No, the slope, see you look at zero,
«zero»: Ari circles the zero n the x 
column on Gur’s worksheet.
[12] Gur Oh that zero, ok. So the slope is minus 5
-5 is the g(x) value when x = 0 
(g(0)=-5).
[13] Ari Yeah. And
[14] Gur How are you supposed to get the other ones?
[15] Ari
You look how many times it’s going down, like we did 
before. So it’s going down by ones. So then it’s easy. This 
is ah by fives. See, it’s going down by ones, so you just look 
here
Ari first points to the x column 
(«going down by ones»), then the 
g(x) column («by fives»), and again 
to g(x) column («look here»).
[16] Gur Oh. So it’s 5
[17] Ari Yeah. 5x plus
[18] Gur Negative 5.
[19] Ari Do you understand?
[20] Gur Negative 5. Yeah, yeah, ok. So what is g 6?
[21] Ari 5 times 6 is 30, plus negative 5 is 25. So we did get it right.
[22] Gur No, but it’s - in this column there?




Oh, then that makes sense. (writes) It’s 30. What is g 10? 
… 40
[25] Ari 20, ah 40. No, 45
[26] Gur No,
[27] Ari 45
[28] Gur Because 20
[29] Ari 10 times 5 is 50, minus
[30] Gur Well, 5 is 20, so 10 must have 40
Points to the two entries in the last 
row.
[31] Ari times 5
Circles the 10 in g(10) on Gur’s 
sheet
[32] Gur Oh, we do that thing. Ok, just trying to find it.
[33] Ari Yeah
[34] Gur Cause I was thinking… cause 5 is 20,
Points again to the last row of the 
table.
[35] Ari It’s 45. Yeah
[36] Gur (mumbles) So it’s 45.
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than constant magnitudes, is a particularly inno-
vative kind of mathematical entity. Because of the 
previously mentioned circularity of the process of 
object construction, much effort must be invested in 
coming to grips with this unfamiliar type of mathe-
matical “thing” (see e.g., Harel & Dubinsky, 1992).
Considering the meta-discursive nature of the 
expected change, it is not surprising that at least one 
of our present protagonists, Gur, is still groping in the 
dark. His partner’s considerable proficiency in dealing 
with questions regarding function stands out against 
this contrasting background. In this situation, it is 
only natural for Ari to take the discursive lead and 
for Gur to assume the role of the learner. On the face 
of it, this is exactly what is happening. Gur seems 
to recognize Ari’s discourse as the model to follow. 
In his attempt to understand what Ari is doing Gur 
persists in interrogating his partner ([2], [4], [14], 
[20], [22]), and although Ari’s explanations do not 
seem truly effective (see Gur’s response, “g(6) = 30” 
in [24], and his insistence that g(10) = 40 in [24], 
[26], and [30])), he eventually renounces his own 
solution for the sake of those proposed by his more 
competent partner ([36]).
If not for this obvious ineffectiveness of Gur’s effort 
to make sense of Ari’s solutions and of Ari’s attempts 
to help, we might have concluded that the children 
are in a full agreement about the learning-teaching 
process. Gur’s apparent failure to learn, however, 
compels us to give additional thought to the ques-
tion of the quality of this agreement. Once we take a 
closer look at Ari and Gur’s interaction, it becomes 
clear that the process of discursive rapprochement is 
hindered by both students’ reluctance to assume the 
respective roles of student and teacher, but especially 
by Ari’s unwillingness to take responsibility for Gur’s 
learning. Although superficially polite, Ari does not 
really respond to Gur’s questions - see, for example, 
how in [5] he continues the sentence he had begun in 
[3] in spite of Gur’s interjected query [4]; even when 
he does respond, his answers show that he has not 
really listened to what Gur was saying (as evidenced 
by his confirmation in [13] of Gur’s erroneous claim 
[12]); even when he inquires about Gur’s unders-
tanding ([19]), he is not really interested in Gur’s 
answer – if he were, he would have noticed that Gur’s 
“Yeah, Yeah, ok” in [20] is immediately followed by a 
question that reveals complete lack of understanding 
of what Ari has been trying to explain); and finally, 
he  ignores Gur’s attempts to explain his own thin-
king – see, in particular the segment [28] – [34]. 
Except for Ari’s implicit refusal to play the role of the 
teacher, the obvious ineffectiveness of Gur’s learning 
can be explained by the boy’s visible attempts to mask 
his role of a follower. Probably to conceal his depen-
dence on Ari’s guidance, he does not persist in his 
requests for explanations and claims understanding 
even when, in fact, he is unable to make any sense of 
what his partner has been saying (see e.g., [20]). He 
is also the one to initiate the transition to the next 
assignment, his (awkwardly camouflaged) inability 
to solve the former one notwithstanding ([24]).
To sum up, in spite of their implicit agreement 
about the discourse that should be given the lead, Ari 
and Gur’s learning-teaching agreement is seriously 
impaired. In this situation, it is not surprising that 
there is almost no progress in Gur’s discursive 
competence either in this brief classroom episode or, 
for that matter, in any other instance of Ari and Gur’s 
collaboration kept in our records.
Coda: How to Interpret the Request for 
Autonomy in Learning?
It is now time to return to the questions asked 
in the beginning of this article: In participationist 
classroom, how can we interpret the request for the 
learner’s autonomy? Which of the possible inter-
pretations would be most beneficial for the student 
and which interpretations should be disqualified 
in advance? On the basis of the foregoing theore-
tical discussion and of empirical episodes analyzed 
above we now wish to claim that while answering 
these questions, we need to make a clear distinction 
between object-level and meta-level learning.
According to Yackel & Cobb (1996),
… [S]tudents who are autonomous in mathematics 
are aware of, and draw on, their own intellectual 
capabilities when making mathematical decisions and 
judgments as they participate in these practices (Kamii, 
1985). These students can be contrasted with those 
who are intellectually heteronomous and who rely on 
the pronouncements of an authority to know how to act 
appropriately. (p. 473)
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Can mathematics students, indeed, restrict 
themselves to their own judgments? Is this call for 
refraining from appeals to authority realistic? In the 
case of object-level learning the answer to both these 
queries is the straightforward yes. When the students 
are already familiar with a given type of discourse and 
the goal of the learning is merely to explore its objects 
and to add to what is known about their properties, 
no special precautions are necessary in interpreting 
the calls for autonomy: The well-defined, familiar 
rules of the discourse should be sufficient, at least 
in principle, to let the student make independent, 
reasoned choices and to help her in resolving any 
possible dilemma. Close acquaintance with the inner 
logic of the discourse exempts the learner from the 
need to consult with others while making discursive 
decisions.
The situation changes when learning is supposed 
to happen at the meta-level. In this case, the exhorta-
tions to let the student “draw on their own intellec-
tual capabilities” and not to “rely on the pronounce-
ments of authority” do not go without saying. In 
particular, one must make it explicitly clear that they 
should not be interpreted as promoting Daedalus’ 
principle of learners’ unrestricted freedom. When 
issued in the context of meta-level learning, these 
two exhortations must thus be carefully explained 
and qualified. The first thing to stress in this context 
is that the two principles make no claims to exclu-
sivity: student’s own judgment is not expected to be 
the sole source of mathematical insights, and refrai-
ning from listening to those who count as authority 
is advisable only as long as there are clear, generally 
adopted criteria for discursive decisions. Claiming 
otherwise would contradict the basic participationist 
tenet that mathematics is historically established 
activity shaped by human choices rather than by 
a transcendental necessity. The view that students 
may, indeed, make a meta-level progress without an 
initial exposure to the discourse of experts could 
thus be sustained only by those who adopt the 
Platonic vision of mathematics and, in fact, negate 
the existence of meta-level learning as described in 
this article.
According to basic commognitive tenets, meta-
level learning happens by scaffolded individualiza-
tion, and for the scaffolding to be effective, there is 
the need for learning-teaching agreement between 
newcomers to the discourse and this discourse’s 
expert oldtimers. Our examples have shown what 
may happen when one or more of the three compo-
nents of learning-teaching agreement are missing 
or distorted, as is the case when, for example, the 
leading discourse is different from the one that is 
practiced by experienced, authoritative interlocutors 
(example 2); when there is no leading discourse and 
no generally accepted discursive authority (example 
3); or when the leading discourse is in place but no 
expert support is available to the learner (example 
4). In all these cases, the expected meta-level lear-
ning is unlikely to happen. When the students are 
left to themselves at the most crucial developmental 
crossroads, there is no reason to assume that they 
will turn in the same direction as the path-breakers 
of the past. At this point, all the options appear 
equally admissible, with none of them having any 
obvious advantage over the others. Left to their own 
inventiveness, the newcomers are likely to reach a 
dead end, as was the case in examples 2 and 3 (for 
the sake of proper disclosure we need to add that in 
both cases the following classroom discussion and 
the students’ own further efforts helped the children 
to find their way out of the entanglement and their 
story did have happy ending, after all). In this situa-
tion, the act of turning to an expert, authoritative 
participant, often disparaged as a sign of students 
“thoughtlessness” is, in fact, the only alternative.
None of this, however, implies that in the case of 
meta-level learning there is no room for the learners’ 
autonomy. To begin with, there is no contradiction 
between the seemingly incompatible scenarios of 
“drawing on one’s own capabilities” and of “relying 
on authority,” provided the word “relying” is not 
taken as tantamount to following Ariadne’s string 
in a mechanical manner. Learner’s autonomy is 
sustained as long as the exposure to expert forms of 
discourse is treated as the beginning rather than end 
of the learning process. The new discursive ways, 
as demonstrated by experts, will now become an 
object of exploration. The question, therefore, that 
one needs to ask herself while trying to assess lear-
ners’ autonomy is not whether the students follow 
authoritative, expert discursants, but rather how 
they are doing this. Is this a thoughtless, ritualized 
following or an exercise in rationalization and in 
critical thinking? Or, to use Bakhtin’s words, do they 
make a sincere effort to turn authoritative discourse 
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into internally persuasive discourse? If the latter, the 
learner enjoys as much autonomy and has as much 
agency as when performing independent object-level 
explorations. In this way, she will eventually turn the 
discourse-for-others into a discourse-for-oneself.
Finally, let us remark that some important, and 
these days seemingly endangered human values 
are being cultivated in the process of learning that 
supports the autonomy of the learner, understood as 
explained above. If this autonomy is to be genuine 
and substantiable, much mutual respect must exist 
among participants. Student’s sincere attempts to 
find reasons for expert choices is an expression of the 
newcomer’s appreciation for oldtimers’ thinking, and 
of her deep a priori confidence in the value of their 
time-honored discourse, painstakingly constructed 
throughout history.
NOTES
1. Indeed, Theseus did make it safely to freedom.
2. According to the legend, Daedalus instructed Icarus not to fly too close to the sun, lest the wax that kept 
his wings together melt. Forgetful of his father’s warning and intoxicated with the feeling of freedom brought 
by the flying, Icarus rose all too high. The wax gave in and the boy fell into the sea.
3. The term meta-rule is used here to distinguish between the rules that govern the mathematical objects 
themselves, and the rules that regulate the activity of exploring these objects. The prefix meta- was added in 
this latter case to stress that these are rules of the discourse itself.
4. It can be shown that the process of construction, called objectification, involves reification - translation of 
the talk about processes into the talk about objects (substitution of nouns for verbs); and alienation – transition 
to impersonal, “agentless” form of talk (Sfard, in press).
5. Think, for example, about the statement, “multiplication makes bigger”, which is fully endorsable in the 
discourse on natural numbers, but stops being so in the discourse on rational numbers.
6.The Kuhnian distinction between growth of knowledge in the period of normal science versus its develo-
pment during scientific revolution (Kuhn, 1962) is the historical counterpart of the distinction between object-
level and meta-level learning.
7. The term discourse-for-oneself is close to Vygotsky’s idea of speech-for-oneself, introduced to denote a stage 
in the development of children’s language (see e.g., Vygotsky, 1987, p. 71). These ideas also brings to mind the 
Bakhtinian distinction between authoritative discourse, a discourse that “binds us, quite independently of any 
power it might have to persuade us internally”; and internally persuasive discourse, one that is “tightly woven 
with ‘one’s own world” (Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 110-111).
8. The notion of learning-teaching agreement can be seen as a communicational counterpart and elaboration 
of Brousseau’s idea of didactic contract, that is, of “the system of [students’ and teachers’] reciprocal obligations” 
(Brousseau, 1997, p. 31). We do not claim that such agreement is sufficient for the success in overcoming 
the communicational gap – we only say it is crucially important for learning. This is a theoretical assertion, 
analytically derived from basic tenets of our approach. The empirical vignettes in the further part of this article 
seem to corroborate this claim.
9. As Vygotsky (1978) reminds us, a sociocultural vision of learning (and, in particular, his own notion zone 
of proximal development) must result in “reevaluation of the role of imitation in learning” (p. 87).
10. This study was conducted in collaboration with Sharon Avgil. The episode is the authors’ translation 
from the Hebrew original. For the full report about this study see Sfard (2007).
11. Arrow model presents a signed number as a vector on the number line, the length of which equals the 
absolute value of the number and the direction of which corresponds to its sign (the vector corresponding to 
a negative number points left and the one corresponding to the positive points right). Magic cubes are enti-
ties which, when inserted into a liquid, increase (in case of the positive numbers) or decrease (for negative 
numbers) the temperature of this liquid by one degree.
12. This is a verbatim translation, but in English this expression could also be presented as “negative five.” 
There is no equivalent of “negative five” in Hebrew. In our translation, we will alternate between the two forms 
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